Abstract-The significant increase in the use of cloud computing, has led to an interest in partitioning applications over a set of public and private clouds in order to meet a range of non-functional requirements including performance (for example where private cloud resources alone are insufficient), dependability (e.g. to allow the application to continue to operate even if one cloud fails) and security (for example to ensure that sensitive data is restricted to sufficiently secure clouds and networks). This paper describes a novel deployment planning algorithm to partition complex workflow-based applications over federated clouds, while meeting security requirements. The security issues are based on our previous work which extends the Bell-LaPadula model to encompass cloud computing. Selecting the cheapest option for partitioning a workflow over a set of resources has been shown to be an NP-hard problem, which can take impractically long for partitioning large workflows over multiple clouds. We therefore introduce a novel adaptive partitioning algorithm to handle these large workflow applications, which significantly reduces the time required to choose a sufficientlygood partitioning option. This is based on generating an initial partitioning, and then adapting it to see if a better solution can be found by bringing together on the same node services with significant communication costs. The algorithm has been implemented and evaluated by using both randomly generated and real world scientific workflows. The experiment results show that our algorithm is thousands times quicker than the exhaustive algorithm presented in our previous work. Yet, on average it generates only 25% more costly solutions. We also compared this algorithm with two other methods commonly used to partition workflows over a set of clouds.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing offers computing resources as a utility like water or electrical power, which means that any organisation or individual can easily rent remote computer and storage resources dynamically to the host networked applications. There are now several cloud providing companies, including Microsoft, Google and Amazon, and each company is making multiple, geographically distributed cloud data centres available. This enables customers to select an individual cloud data centre based on their requirements for price, functionality, latency and governance regulations. However, it also opens the possibility of running applications over a set of cloud data centres to meet availability requirements. This has led to an interest in the idea of federated clouds [1] [2] , but the main push for these has been security. Some organisations have sensitive data or services that they are not prepared to host on public cloud. A potential solution to this also comes from the idea of federated clouds: deploy those parts of applications that are sensitive on trusted internal IT resources within an organisation (on what have come to be known as private clouds), but allow those parts with fewer security requirements to be deployed on public clouds where they can take advantage of their scalability and cost benefits.
Achieving this is not necessarily straightforward, especially for complex applications. There can be a very large number of options for how to deploy the data and services across a set of clouds, each of which will have a different cost model. Therefore, in this paper we tackle one of the main problems faced by organisations wishing to exploit federated clouds: how to select a deployment option that meets their security requirements, while at the same time minimising the cost that a given deployment will incur.
We describe the design and evaluation of an algorithm to partition an application structured as a workflow over a federated cloud in order to exploit the strengths of each cloud. The algorithm improves our previous method presented in [3] , making it suitable for large workflow applications. The previous method, based on the Bell-LaPadula [4] Multi-Level Security model [5] , gave a solution for partitioning a workflow over a set of clouds to meet certain security requirements. However, in order to find the cheapest workflow deployment, all of the potential partitioning options needed to be listed and ranked to find the cheapest one. Although this method gives the optimal and guarantees that the result is the cheapest deployment (we use ACO which means always cheapest option to represent this method in the following paragraphs), it is not very scalable. For example, it can take more than 15 minutes to optimally partition a workflow comprising 12 blocks (services and data items) over 4 clouds. The complexity of the method is O(c s ), where c is the number of clouds and s is the number of blocks. Therefore increasing the number of the blocks in the workflow, raises the partitioning time exponentially.
Consequently, to handle more complex workflows and larger cloud federations our idea is to sacrifice some cost in order to reduce the time to produce a recommended deployment option. We present an approximate algorithm which still meets Bell-LaPadula security requirements. Its time complexity ap-proximated closely to O(2 · s · c) but gives an acceptable yet suboptimal result in terms of costs. We highlight the challenges and contributions of this paper as follows.
• The main contribution of this work is a deployment planning algorithm that minimises the time taken to derive a partitioning of a large workflow application across federated clouds so as to meet security requirements and reduce the price paid by the organisation for executing the workflow. The algorithm takes into account the three main sources of financial cost in the cloud: computation, data transfer and data storage. To estimate these costs we analysed the provenance traces of our case. Other work [6] [7] [8] describe how to predict those information using execution logs or workflow input data.
• We build on our previous work of using a version of the Bell-LaPadula Multi-level model easier to guarantee that the selected deployment option meets the organisation's security requirements.
• We evaluate our algorithm by using both randomly generated workflows, and a real world scientific workflow, and compare the experimental results with our previous work and other methods. The paper is structured as follows. The following section reviews related work. The security problem and the cost issue are discussed in Section III. Next, the algorithm is presented in Section IV, followed by an illustrative example. In Section VI the complexity of the algorithm is briefly analysed. Finally, our experimental results are discussed and conclusion are drawn.
II. RELATED WORK
Cost optimisation has been a classic research topic for decades. Existing work has attempted to solve the workflowmapping problem using DAG scheduling heuristics such as [9] , [10] , [11] , to name just a few. However, these algorithms are all based on "free" grid resources and thus aim to minimise makespan. In clouds the providers charge a monetary cost depending on three factors (computation, data transfer and data storage). Our work takes these factors into account and partitions workflows over federated clouds and minimise the monetary cost.
To reduce the monetary cost various techniques has been proposed previously including rule-based techniques [12] and model-based techniques [13] , [14] . In paper [14] , the cost is minimised by transforming the structure of workflow applications in a single cloud. In contrast, our work uses a modelbased technique on federated clouds.
Research related to federated clouds or multicloud environments is still new with little literature available. In [15] , the authors introduce a pricing model and a truthful mechanism for scheduling workflow applications to different clouds. Chen and Deelman described in [16] how to use Genetic Algorithm (GA) to map a workflow to different clouds to minimise the monetary cost. While both of the papers are focused on minimising the monetary cost of completely executing workflow applications, neither consider the security issues that can limit the set of options.
Compared with our previous work [3] , this algorithm avoids generating all possible results to achieve cost minimisation, which makes it much more efficient in dealing with more complex workflows (this is evaluated in SectionVII). In order to extend the evaluation, we have applied the security model to both GA and the Greedy Algorithm to compare the results with our algorithm. Our algorithm shows better performance in cost optimisation. The details are described in Section VII.
With regards to the security of cloud computing, most research focuses on improving security of the data centres [17] , [18] , [19] and [20] , etc. [20] introduces a monitoring architecture to ensure the security and flexibility of a virtual machine. Conversely, we consider improving security by deploying services of a workflow application on different clouds to meet their security requirements.
In paper [21] , the authors propose a approach to partition business workflow applications over a set of clouds to meet the security constraints. However, the paper focuses on minimising the communication to improve the reliability of the workflow enactment. In contrast, our aim is to minimise the monetary cost of enactment of scientific workflows which are often characterised by high demand in processing power and/or requiring the transfer and storage of large amounts of data.
III. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
A workflow-based application consists of a set of services and data. It can be represented as a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG), G = (S, E), where the vertices S are the set of services, and edges E are a set of dependencies between those services. A workflow-based application can have several different types of dependency relationships, but here we only consider data dependency, which means a data item is generated from a source service and consumed by a destination service. For example, e i,j represents a data dependency between service s i and service s j . To represent data dependencies we use a distance matrix D = [d i,j ] of size |S| × |S| where a d i,j value greater than zero indicates not only there is a dependency between s i and s j but also the size of data transmitted between them. Furthermore, C represents a set of clouds which are available for deployment.
A. Security Rules
A security model is needed to determine whether a deployment of services and data to a set of clouds meets an organisation's security requirements. We reuse our previous model [3] , which builds on the Bell-LaPadula and incorporate the security levels of the clouds, data and services. Three security matrices represent these security level:
• SecS is a |S| × 2 matrix which describes the security levels of each service. Each service is assigned two security levels: "Clearance" and "Location". "Clearance" represents the service's highest security level, and "Location" is the required operation security level of the service in a specific application. The clearance of a service must be greater than or equal to its location. To make the rest represents the security location of data item d i,j .
• SecC is a vector representing the security location of each cloud.
Our security model consists of three rules. Firstly, NRU or "no-read-up", means service s j cannot read d i,j , if the data's location is higher than its own clearance. Let CoS j represents the clearance of service s j ; similarly, SecD i,j is d i,j 's location value. Therefore, the NRU rule is defined as
Next, the "no-write-down" rule NW D indicates that service s i cannot write data d i,j to lower location value than its own location. The location value of service s i is LoS i .
Finally, when extending Bell-LaPdula to cloud computing, rule CS guarantees the security for the deployment of data and services on a cloud. It is defined such that location of a cloud must be greater than or equal to the location both any service and data that are hosted by the cloud. Note, that if data is transmitted from one cloud to another then this rule must be applied to both, the sending and receiving clouds. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the clearance and location attributes of services, data and clouds; where the "→" represents the "≥" relationship, and l, c are location and clearance respectively.
B. Representing Cost Requirements
We assume that the clouds are linked in a fully connected topology but the data can be freely transferred between clouds only if the security requirements described above are met. Additionally, a cloud can run several services at the same time.
To represent cost we first define some basic metrics of our cost model: Given these basic metrics we now define a set of cost functions that we will use later in our algorithm:
• First is the data storage cost:
Where data is transferred from cloud c h to another cloud (to transfer it from one partition of the application to another held on a different cloud) we make the assumption that data only remains stored on the source cloud so as not to double-account for the cost. A reason for storing the output of a partition even after the data it generates has been sent to another cloud is that if the destination cloud fails, it provides a way to continue the computation on another cloud without having to restart the execution of the whole workflow.
• The communication cost of a set of data transferred from service s i to s j , which are deployed on cloud h and f respectively, can be defined as:
Note that when both s i and s j are deployed on the same cloud the communication cost is 0.
• SCOST and CCOST are used to derive the key functions in our algorithm, SOC and COD. SOC(s f i ) is the costs incurred in bringing the input data consumed by service s i to cloud c f before the service is executed.
This includes the storage cost and communication cost
The COD function denotes the extended cost of having a service deployed on a specific cloud. It is calculated by adding the computing cost of the service s i to the transmission cost and storage cost of data sent from any of its predecessor services that are not in the same cloud.
which is used to determine the initial deployment of workflow services to clouds. Each value in the matrix is defined as preplan i,h = COD(s h i ). Thus, each row of the matrix therefore contains COD values for a selected service as deployed on each specific cloud (except where deploying the service on a cloud would violate the security requirements). The initial deployment is then based on the smallest COD value in each row (i.e. for each service). Later, to improve this initial deployment we use the "Re-Deployment Method" (discussed in the following section) which generates the final deployment matrix for each service. The final deployment is stored in a |S|×|C| adjacency matrix DEP . Where dep i,h = 1 indicates that service s i is deployed on cloud c h . Consequently, the total COST of deploying a workflow application is:
The COD function is used to determine the initial deployment of services to clouds. It does not provide optimal deployment because it takes into account only the local costs related to each single service considered in isolation. Thus, the idea of our algorithm is to use more information in the planning of the final deployment and to make short term sacrifice for long term benefit. We call our algorithm NCF (not cheapest first). The algorithm consists of three steps. First, it starts by applying security rules to verify whether security requirements are met by the original workflow. We use rule CS to verify security for deploying services to clouds. Next, if the security requirements are met, we use COD to calculate the initial deployment matrix P reP LAN . Finally, the "Re-Deployment Method" is applied to improve the initial deployment, which works by combining services deployed in different clouds into a single cloud. The overall aim is to detect whether the costs can be reduced by avoiding intercloud communication and related storage costs.
The following sections describe the algorithm steps in more details.
A. Workflow Security Checking
The workflow is valid iff all return NRU and NWD values are true. OOtherwise, the workflow is invalid, security check returns error and the whole algorithm stops. The pseudocode of the "Workflow Security Check" is shown in Algorithm 1. 
Algorithm 1 Workflow Security Check

B. Initial Deployment
The initial deployment of services is based on the smallest COD value of each service taking into account security requirements checked by the CS rule. If a cloud c h generates the smallest COD value but does not meet requirements imposed by CS, a cloud with the second smallest COD value is considered. The algorithm works until it finds a cloud that can meet the security requirements and the COD value associated with this cloud is stored in vector REC. If no cloud is found that meets CS, the algorithm stops. Algorithm 2 shows pseudocode for the initial deployment step. 
Algorithm 2 Initial Deployment
C. Re-Deployment Method
The core idea behind the "Re-Deployment Method" is to avoid scheduling services to the clouds which bring huge communication cost. To realise this we use two functions "detect" and "replace" which are defined as follows:
REC(s h ) > MIN(SET C(si)) b
From the description above, the minimal COD value of each service and the pre-planned deployment are recorded in REC and P reP LAN respectively. The detect function determines four different cases based on this and additional information:
• s i,max denotes the service s i 's child service with maximum COD value.
• SET P (s i ) is a set which includes service s i,max and all its parent services.
• SET C(s i ) includes s i and all its child services.
• MIN(SET ) is the minimum cost of deploying the services from SET on a single cloud which meets security requirements of all services in SET .
• a is true if the cost of the initial deployment of the services in SET P (s i ) is greater than the cost of MIN(SET P (s i )) • b is true if the cost of the initial deployment of the services in SET C(s i ) is greater than the cost of MIN(SET C(s i )) Given all this information detect returns four different sets of services. In case1 it returns SET P (s i ), in case2 it returns SET C(s i ), in case3 it returns one of SET P , SET C which has smaller MIN value. Finally, in case4 it returns {s i }.
After the services are selected by detect, the replace function is invoked to assign these services into a cloud which minimises deployment cost. The pseudocode is shown in Algorithm 3.
V. AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
The workflow, shown in Figure 2 , will be used to demonstrate the algorithm. More complicated workflows will be evaluated in section VII.
Workflow and cloud cost information are shown in Tables I, II, III, IV. Additionally, the security levels of the Algorithm 3 Re-Deployment Method US = S // is a set of unscheduled services for si ∈ US do switch(detect(si)) case1:replace(SET P (si)) case2:replace(SET C(si)) case3: Table V. Before assigning the services to clouds, the security of the workflow is checked. From Table V , every service and data meet the security rules NRU and NW D.
Next, the workflow has to be pre-assigned by following the function COD and security rule CS. The initial deployment is shown in Figure 3 and the cost is 1045.
To improve on the initial deployment, the "Re-Deployment Method" is applied. When detect(s1) is applied, the value of s h ∈SET P (si) REC(s 1 ) = 530 and MIN(SET P (s1)) = 300 (SET P (s1) includes s1 and s3, and " Cloud1" is the one to minimise the cost). In addition, s h ∈SET C(si) REC(s 1 ) = 845, while MIN(SET C(s1)) = 550 (s1, s2 and s3 are selected for SET C(s1), and "Cloud1" is also the best choice ). In this example, both case1 and case2 are satisfied. However, the former case has cheaper MIN value, therefore assigning services in SET P (s1) to "Cloud1".
Next, after applying the detect method to "s2", "s2" belongs case4, and is assigned to "Cloud1" after replace(s2) is invoked. Similarly, service "s4" is also allocated to "Cloud1" after the application of "Re-Deployment Method". Conse- quently, all services are assigned to "Cloud1", and the cost is 750.
VI. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
In our algorithm, we split the workflow security check and pre-planned deployment into two parts, because this can make the algorithm easier to understand. However, they can be combined in one step. This makes calculations more efficient and results in complexity O(|E| × |C|), where E is the set of data dependency edges and C is the set of clouds. The detect and replace functions have to compare the cost of a service and its immediate predecessor services in a pre-planned situation with the cost of deploying these services in one cloud. However, the complexity of the algorithm is also impacted by the structure of the workflow. If the workflow is linear, the complexity in the worst case becomes O(|E + S| × |C|). Conversely, for a star-shaped workflow the best case complexity is O(|E|×|C|).
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we compare and evaluate our algorithm with ACO and other popular algorithms. Two types of workflow are tested in our experiments. One is randomly generated, the other is an example of a real world scientific workflow.
A. Randomly Generated Workflows
In this case, the workflow is represented by a distance matrix D in which if d i,j is greater than 0 that means service s i sends data to service s j . The value represents the size of data that is transferred between them. We create a n × n matrix with "-1" as the initial value. Next, the values of the matrix are assigned randomly, however we make sure that workflows are connected and acyclic.
In the experiment, we consider five different clouds that are assigned security levels from 0 to 4 randomly and stored in SecC vector. The other required matrices are generated in a similar way.
The experiments are implemented in the Java language and run on a 4-Cores machine with 2 GHz Intel Core i7 processor, 8G RAM and OS X MAvericks. Figure 4 denotes the execution time of the NCF algorithm for different workflows which have different numbers of blocks, as shown on the x-axis from 2 to 30. In all cases the time was less than 1 millisecond. However, the execution time does not grow linearly with the number of blocks because the time complexity depends also on the structure of the workflow. In our experiment we can control the number of clouds, services and edges but the structure of the workflow is randomly generated. Note also that due to huge differences in the execution time of NCF and other algorithms, we present in the Figures ratio alg/N CF rather than absolute execution time.
The time cost of each column is the mean value of ten different structures of workflows. For example, we calculate the time cost of a workflow with five blocks by mean of the time cost of the algorithm which is applied to ten different 5 blocks workflows. As Figure 5 shows, the time cost of the ACO is significant ascent when the workflow which has more than 10 blocks. Figure 5 compares the ACO and NCF algorithms. The x-axis shows the number of blocks in random workflows, which is from 2 to 12 blocks, and the y-axis is the ratio of execution time of ACO by execution time of NCF. As presented there is a sudden surge in run time of the ACO algorithm when workflows have more than 10 blocks
The relative monetary cost of both algorithms is displayed in Figure 6 . In most cases NCF is very close to the optimum with the worst case result we found being 25% higher than reported by ACO. The reason for this gap is that NCF can only improve the result by adjusting the deployment of the immediate predecessor services of the current planning service. However, further away services are not considered by our algorithm.
To generate the results of more complex workflows by using ACO is very time costly; therefore we also compare our algorithm with GA and Greedy Algorithm (GR). Both are popular methods to deploy large workflow systems on federated clouds proposed in [16] . As Figure 7 shows, the deployment options generated by our algorithm are closer to the optimal options. For 30-block workflow NCF generates solution that is 20% less costly than GA and 36% less costly than GR Besides, NCF is thousands of times faster than GA to generate a deployment option, and only 13 times slower than GR in the worst case, as shown in Figure 8 , 9. These experimental results are generated by testing more than 750 workflows, between 5 blocks and 30 blocks.
B. Workflows from a Real Scientific Application
To verify our algorithm for real workflow, we used one from the Cloud e-Genome project [22] (Figure 10 ). The project's overall goal is to facilitate the adoption of genetic testing in clinical practice at a population scale. To realise this goal, Cloud e-Genome uses workflow modelling to program the whole exome sequencing pipeline, cloud computing to run the workflows on large scale and provenance of workflow enactment to achieve reproducibility. All these aspects are supported by the e-Science Central platform (e-Science Central) [23] used to develop the pipeline Although security aspects are not in the central focus of this pilot project, guaranteeing that human genome data can be securely processed on the cloud is a key issue. Therefore, we selected a workflow from Cloud e-Genome and modelled its security requirements by assigning security levels as shown in Tables VIa and VIb. The services "Data In" and "Data Out" are e-Science Central storage services which are not represented by blocks. Therefore they were not included in the Figure 10 Using logs collected by e-Science Central, we were able to determine the size of data transferred between workflow blocks execution times. Table VIa includes execution times in hours; 0 means that the times was less than 1 minute. Table VIb shows data sizes in GB and 0 means the size was less than 1 MB. From this data we calculated the cost of running the workflow in clouds offered by two major cloud providers.
The pricing of the clouds is shown in Table VII . We chose the same type of Virtual Machines in both clouds and also refer to public and private cloud setup offered by both providers; the private cloud setup is more secure yet more expensive. In the same table we present also data transfer costs between the clouds.
From these inputs, services S1 and S5 are assigned to Azure public cloud, and others are located in Azure private cloud. The total cost is 84.319 dollars.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper has described a novel, efficient scalable algorithm to automatically partition complex workflows over a federated clouds while meeting security requirements and minimizing exection cost. The main contribution of this paper is to redesign the exact algorithm presented in our previous work to enable it to be applied in real world scenarios by reducing the time it takes to generate a low-cost, secure partitioning option.
The algorithm was tested on randomly generated workflows and real world scientific workflows. Comparing with other methods, the time complexity of our algorithm has a significant advantage, and the cost is very close to the cost of the optimal deployments and less than the cost of deployments that generated from widely used algorithms. In the future work we will extend the algorithm to handle dynamic changes in the cloud environment (such as cloud failure) and will develop a tool to real-time monitoring of clouds and workflows. 
